by MARCPELLETIER » Tue May 02, 2006 9:20 pm
Semper,
I don't know the code, but I do think that Hal is "roughly" consistent, and your data show that consistency.
As a rule of thumb, when a game is tight (equal or less than one run difference) Hal is likely to change the SP for a reliever if
-a runner gets on-base
-a reliever offers a better face-to-face scenario against the upcoming hitter than the SP
-relief can go deep (lots of fresh relievers available) OR you're getting close to the pitcher's number of innings before tiredness
With this rule of thumb, I can explain many of the moves Hal did with your team.
(Given you've changed your bullpen roster a few times during the season, I can't go into exact details)
Game 40: game is tight, getting close to S7, a runner gets on-base, Riske is better vs rhh than Prior (Atkins)
Game 60: game is tight, bullpen is deep, a runner gets on-base, Mullholand is better vs lhh than Haren (Sizemore, Counsell)
Game 49: game is tight, bullpen is deep, a runner gets on-base, Riske is a better match-up vs Cirillo than Pedro (Cirillo is weak, so Riske's HR not at risk; and Riske has less doubles and triples than Pedro, so less chances of allowing a run)
Game 45: harder to justify given that no one went on-base. But Pedro is in his S7 and has allowed two runners in the sixth, so he was close to his tired point. And just like game 45, you were losing by one run, and a weak right-handed hitter was coming at-bat. So a lot of consistency with game 45. Perhaps Hal preferred Politte---and a chance of walk---to Pedro's chances of doubles and triples.
Please note that in ALL preceding games, you were losing by exactly one run when Hal made his move. Pretty consistant.
As for the other games:
Game 25: Game is tight, one runner is allowed, you're leading by two, it's the 8th inning, in one word: it's a set-up/closer job. Plus, Wagner offers a much better face-to-face scenario vs Schneider than Pedro (which was nullyfied by the pinch-hitter Cameron)
Game 53: You were leading by two runs most of the way. Pedro allowed almost no men on base. Hence very few occasions to remove him. Relief was in danger to be thin with all bullpen participating in game 52. But Wagner came because he has the closer job (probably would have not come if he wasn't set as closer). Explains why Pedro stood all along until the 9th.
Game 9: same environment as game 53. Same result. Explains why Pedro stood all along until the 9th.
GAme 13: game has been tied all the way. Pedro has never been one hitter away of becoming tired. No right-handed weak hitter, so no risk of having Riske as a better match-up than Pedro. Explains why Pedro stood all along.
Game 33: not sure what is your complaint, but Pedro was one out away of his maximum. One runner got on-base. Cabrera is weak vs lhp, but N vs rhp, so Wagner potentially a better match-up. Later, Wagner was getting in his third inning, Politte was a better match-up vs Crosby.
The last game with Lee. This is a case where you were losing by three runs or more early in the game---putting Hal in a conservative mode, given your settings-----AND Lee has never been close of becoming tired (no hit/walk in both 7th and 8th, only one hit allowed in the 9th). So Hal never had to activate the "quick hook" mode.
In my eyes, there is solid consistency:
--Hal triggers the run with more rapidity when losing by one run. When losing by one run, particular with a man getting on-base, Hal definitively looks for the best potential match-up, which could trigger an quicker hook than usual. As if Hal was doing his best to not let the game go off hand. Call this over-managing, but it's pretty consistent.
(in my experience, this is true mostly with conservative settings. With aggressive settings, I feel that Hal is aggressive down by one run or leading by one run)
-- Conservative mode is perfectly illustrated by the fact that Hal leaves the starter there when losing early or when winning by two runs or more, particularly if no one gets on-base, until we're getting close to the tiredness point.