by PotKettleBlack » Mon Sep 15, 2008 1:11 pm
Very late to discussion, but here's a take.
From 2000-2005, 12.6% of MLB AB's were in what Stat defines as a "clutch" opportunity (2 out, man in scoring).
Here's your breakdown of two out situations:
---
1--
-2-
--3
12-
1-3
-23
123
Of these, two (the most common) are not clutch situations (to my understanding). So, 12.6%, from 2000-2005. Maybe generalizable to ATG, probably mostly. The two out ABs have to come one way or another, right?
Here's a fun question. Given two very good hitters, say Bagwell and Connor in ATGIV, would you rather have Bagwell (big negative clutch, but reasonable advantage the other 87.4% of the time) or Connor (still pretty good, but large positive clutch). I suppose you'd have to look at the leverage of the situations. If I'm already ahead (more likely with a team of 9 Bagwells than 9 Connors), I won't need clutch hitting, and we're in low leverage. If I'm close and late, you'd rather have Connors, but doesn't having Connors cause you to be in more close and lates in the first place?
I think, ultimately, clutch becomes a question not entirely different from the resource allocation discussion between starters and relief pitchers. If you have shut down starters and a banging offense, you'll have less close and late for your Narleski to Eckersley to pitch. On the flip side, you might believe (as many do) that close and late is inevitable (you are shutdown pitchers, very good offense, you come up against your mirror image team... shutdown pitchers with very good offense). Then clutch and bullpen are worthwhile investments, maybe.
Probably needs some analysis to back up the thinking, but if two guys are the same, I'll take the guy with the better clutch (why not... if everything else is the same, the guy with the better clutch is some bit better 12.6% of the time... in a Bagwell to Connor comparison, Clutch Connor becomes better than Normal Bagwell, and Clutch Bagwell becomes worse than Regular Connor... all at a $1M extra cost for Bags).