gbrookes wrote:I checked the offence base running stats for the Blue Bombers. Instead of 35/10/7, I calculate 44/11/9. Not too far off, which is kinda interesting, given the very high number of base running situations defensively - which I was kinda shooting for by my strategy.
In terms of how strat seems to be keeping track of base running events, advances and outs, here are a couple of theories for reconciling the differences between their calcs and mine:
1. It really looks like they DON'T count situations where a batter tries to take an extra base from a hit on his own card. So for example, Marte and Zobrist have each been thrown out in those situations, but those don't appear to be counted in strat's totals - so they have 7, whereas I have 9 thrown out runners. They have no throw-outs for Zobrist, whereas I have 1, stretching a single into a double on a throw home to the plate. Similarly, I have 2 throw outs for Marte, whereas strat shows 1 - with Marte having been thrown out at second trying to stretch a single into a double with no-one on.
2. As for the advances, I'm really not sure, but I have a feeling they didn't count a sac fly which moved a runner to third, instead of sending him home.
Obviously, I show a lot more opportunities than strat does (44 compared to 35) - about 25% more opportunities. Generally speaking, though, my figures for the advances and outs are closer to their numbers, as noted above.
What that tells me is that my pitching staff has allowed a LOT MORE "runnable" hits than most other pitching staffs - which is what I was expecting. My basis for saying that is that I calculate that they've allowed 58 base running opportunities. By comparison, the average for the league is probably around 44 opportunities the way I count it - 35 average per strat, times 125% gross-up for the way I calculate opportunities, compared to strat's calculation.
So by my estimate, my pitching staff has given up about 14 more base running opportunities than my estimate of the league average (58 versus 44). My theory is that with a good set of outfield arms, the extra opportunities are essentially nullified by the deterrent factor of the strong outfield arms.
My theory is that the run production value of the "runnable" singles and doubles is therefore diminished by the outfielders' arms. Since the pitchers' salaries would be reduced to reflect the value of these runnable hits (again, just a theory on my part), I should, in theory, be getting more value for them, for the good aspects of their pitching cards (low home runs, good pitcher's fielding - almost no errors, double play balls induced, etc.).
Thanks for indulging my rambling thoughts. My curiosity makes me want to explore these odd theoretical tangents. I hope you find it somewhat interesting.
GB, some thoughts on your "ramblings":
- Fly A are almost certainly not a throw so shouldn't be counted.
- Fly B's are probably in the same boat whereas Fly B? are advancing situations. Since you said you didn't go through all the Sac Fly possibilities, I think you are prolly over counting Sac Flies.
- If the runner advances behind a throw then I would think that Hal isn't counting it. So, if a batter hits a single with a guy on second and that runner attempts to score *and* the throw goes home, and the batter goes to second, I don't think it's counted. Otherwise you'd have to chances on one play.
- If there is a throw to third on a single with a guy at first, the runner automatically advances that also would not be counted because there is no option to throw for the trail runner.
- I'm not sure that all Do** or Si* are considered running situations. I think the computer randomly selects which are and which aren't. That would likely be the cause of your higher count.