joethejet wrote:Spider 67 wrote:Lost another 1-runner last night - to Geoff - SURPRISE! Geoff is now up 20 in that category.
Except for Semper and BiA, records fall nicely close to the Pythag adjusted for half of the 1-run difference.
And I'm down 10 after last night. Man this team is a bunch of chokers. Left 19 on in the last two games that I lost.
Joe, I'm not saying that what I'm about to say is right. I'm just tossing it out as a theory to debate. (By the way, I haven't been able to start my analysis yet).
And I need to say that my record in 1 run and XI games definitely includes a huge amount of luck.
But if I allow for a large amount of luck, is it possible that there is still something in the makeup of this Moose team that has some late game advantages? I'm not talking about specific games (yet), but just an overall idea that makes for a better than average performance in close, late games. (As an aside, my last team, the Mooseheads, had a good record in 1 run games - 34-22, but were 10-15 in extra innings games).
So here's a theory - or a couple of theories:
First, we're all under a salary cap. So the money we spend goes to different things. You could summarize it by Starters, Reliever/closers, batting, speed, arms, and fielding.
In modern baseball, even in strat, you don't usually have your starting pitcher still going in the 9th inning and extra innings. There are still some complete games, but they are becoming a low percentage of overall games.
So, if the starting pitcher isn't in the game, then the dollars that you spend on a SP are no longer working for you on the field at that moment in the game.
If you're lucky enough to be tied or close, late in a game (lucky because you had a deficit vs. your opponent when comparing SPs), then theoretically you should have more $ working for you on the field late in the game. Theoretically that should translate into an advantage at that point in the game. Hence, perhaps over a large number of close games, it could be a slight advantage in converting close games into wins. (Whether or not you get to that close, late game after beginning the game with a SP deficit is a different issue, which I'm abstracting away from for the moment).
Second - I have a hunch - and that's all it is - that Hal might actually build game situations into his baserunning decisions. Hal still makes baserunning "mistakes" in game situations, but my anecdotal observations are that I don't recall seeing strategic baserunning mistakes occurring as often in the last 2 years. (We used to see them being made often by Hal). My hunch is that baserunning (net of opposition arms) can be a factor in 1 run games - especially in singles ballparks, where there are relatively more baserunners to send. If there are baserunning situations in close games, it's possible that the ability to get a runner home from a distant scoring position could be a strategic advantage in close games. I have no idea at this point whether that will be borne out, or disproved, by my review of my own close games. It's something that I'll be interested to test with the data. By the way, my previous studies on baserunning suggest to me that only a small fraction of ballpark singles result in extra baserunning possibilities - most are treated by the game engine as SI* results, with no extra baserunning. But even the fact that there is a higher batting average and OB% in a singles park could help to maximize this effect in a late, close game. Putting this second point simply - does Hal get more aggressive in sending runners when there is the possibility for the extra base to be the game winning (or game tying) run, or is it just the same as all game situations? Or, does the enhanced ability to take an extra base provide an inherent increase in your chances to score the game winning (or game tying) run, just by its nature? Is the advantage of that enhanced ability magnified in a close, late game? I think that some of these answers might be "yes".
Thirdly, is the advantage of a homerun-oriented offense less effective in a late, close game, compared to a singles oriented offense? Part of the advantage of a homerun-oriented offense is that you can score multiple runs with one swing of the bat. But in extra innings, that advantage is moot, most of the time, since you only need ONE run to win the game. The only advantage of multiple runs is when your opponent also scores in the same inning. So, is there an inherent advantage to a singles-oriented offense in a late, close game, when only one run is needed, most of the time? In other words, a singles-oriented offense might score an average of 4 runs a game, but it's based on a higher probability of scoring at least one run. By comparison, a homerun oriented offense might score 4 runs a game on average, but it has a higher probability of scoring multiple runs in one inning. But the homerun offense might have a lower probability of scoring at least one run, when compared to the singles-oriented offense. (There are theories that I haven't proven - this assumption needs to be tested). If this theory about probabilities of scoring at least one run are accurate, then a singles-oriented offense would have an advantage in extra innings, due to its (assumed) higher probability of scoring at least one run in an inning.
I'm tossing these out to the group right now as possible theories, to generate some discussion. I hope to gain some insights into this by studying the close games.
Sun May 10, 2015 6:39 pm
He's also unuckly in one runners, but lucky in singles. Interestingly enough his pythag is dead-on. JTJ has sucked in one run and pythag, but has been lucky with BPSI.
His game winning inning featured 7 straight rolls, five for hits on his card. 
