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- Joined: Fri Aug 24, 2012 6:27 pm
I was going to keep quiet but the hindsight involved in Monday morning quarterbacking and post hoc analytics should be a perfect 20-20, yet in Marc's post from last night, I don't know that it was.
I agree that Cristano's self-created analytic model using Excel to predict a team's performance is a potent tool conferring upon him a unique advantage over the rest of us. But I'm not sure that he is the best GM in the game, nor am I sure that I am the best manager, roles that Marc appears to have somewhat arbitrarily assigned us.
I was not aware, as Marc asserted, that he previously stated that the best way to beat the Four Aces strategy was a "one-sided extreme powerhouse stadium." Poor me, I had to rack my feeble, analytically challenged brain to come up with my own solution to that problem. But I theorized that ANY extreme hitting ballpark should pose significant problems for the Four Aces, then verified my solution in the crucible of ATG league play. It was easy to do because, as Cristano noted in our last private exchange a few days ago, we get copied -a lot - so the 4 Aces strategy became a ubiquitous part of most 100M leagues after his very public success with it.
Now I thought long and hard about what park to play in this time and I chose Hilltop, in part to show Cristano that he was basically full of shit when he dismissed righty parks as a viable strategy in the BS finals, back in our infamous 2017 trash talking BS finals thread. Although when we choose parks in the BS finals, insanely enough we have no idea what division we will land in, unlike any other live drafts on this website, I had long since concluded that Hilltop would be the best stadium to combat the 4-aces strategy. Minute Maid leaves one too vulnerable to the Kerry Woods, Joel Pineiros and Don Suttons of the set, and if you include two or three lefties to reduce the vulnerability, they lose too much due to park effects. Hilltop allows extreme righty hitting but the 1-17 single for lefties allows you to play 2-4 lefties / switch hitters and still do well. The only downside to Hilltop is that 1-17 ballpark single against lefties, but I minimized that with Hammaker in my rotation and Sutter and Myers giving up no ballpark hits at all against lefties. In particular I wanted to combat hallerose as he was clearly going for the same strategy as last year's team. This worked to perfection as the money he spent on Kison and Swift for use mostly against me and Mesquiton, ended up wasted and he finished 7-17 against me, and those two ended up with stratospheric era's. Basically I could bat up to 4 lefties against hard righties, especially on the road, which completely negates their value. Also with my three lefty starters, and the preponderance of lefty starters in the league, I dismissed Lab's chances from the outset and his decision to bench Bonds in 15 games so that Bobby Adams could play 3b and Duncan dh, really confirmed that assessment. I would have kept Bonds at DH, have Duncan play second and move Sanchez to 3b against lefties, and that would have significantly improved his offense with relatively minor impact on his defense. In any event, the best decision I made in this finals was to play in Hilltop, stocked with appropriate personnel to take maximum advantage of what Hilltop offered me.
From his post, Marc appears to not have a great deal of respect for how I value players. To see where this is coming from, here is the thread where we had our discussion about Mays' value: viewtopic.php?f=6&t=642570&hilit=200M+Draft+Ranking+WAR. I respect the time Marc put into his WAR thread and his painstaking attention to detail, but the assumptions in his WAR model don't seem to take into account extreme park effects, at least as I understood it at the time, and the effects of ballpark homeruns cannot be overstated in assessing player value.
If I recall, Marc had Mays ranked 32nd in WAR value at 200M with a 1.69 WAR. Prior to his post two years ago, in live draft leagues Mays was an automatic late first round pick. Now, you can often get him in the late second or even third round, at least you could until I stopped playing high caps - rampant copying because of the transparency of live drafts occasioned my departure from those adventures. I do thank Marc - however belatedly - for his influence positively impacting Mays' availability.
Now Marc somehow assumes he values Schmidt more highly than I do. Just ask Salty, a long time live draft stalwart, how many of my teams Schmidt appeared on the first year after his 1981 season card was added to the set. Back then I could draft him in the fifth round or even later. After Marc's WAR thread, he jumped up a couple of rounds, which irked me to no end. I would assert that I was the first person in ATG to recognize how good a card he has and then work him to death. He was a mainstay of my Polo and Minute Maid teams for several years, especially at 200M and up caps. Eventually though I abandoned him. Why, you might ask? Well when you have played over 1800 leagues you begin to notice some odd patterns. One that I have noticed is that if you regularly overuse any player, he will get injured disproportionately in future leagues. With Schmidt being a 15 game injury risk, that became a real problem for all but the highest caps. So now I use him sparingly, and in the recent finals he never got injured (I rested him the last series to ensure that), and he performed as I expected him to (given that there were really only two other parks friendly to right handed power). Ditto for Mays and McGwire. I could say a great deal more about why Mays was an essential ingredient to my team, but I have no wish to convince anyone of that reality, least of all Marc.
So truth be told, the trio of Mays, McGwire and Schmidt were nearly indispensable reasons for whatever success I achieved in the 2018 Barnstormer's finals, and that is a testament to GM acumen and precise assessment of player value regardless of what Marc asserts as WAR gospel.