Sat Nov 09, 2024 10:09 pm
Going back once more just to the topic of defense....with a few (too many) words about gbX roll results on a pitcher card.
X results are of course where your fielders' defensive ratings most manifestly come into play.
On both sides (L & R) of the vast majority of pitcher cards, there is one gb(2b)X on a 7 roll. (I'm going to guesstimate 90% of them.) When 2 6-sided dice are rolled, there is a 16.667% chance the result will be 7. Because a 7 is the highest probability result on any given dice roll, one concludes correctly that over the course of the season a good fielding second baseman will prevent more runners reaching base than a poor one.
Let's look at shortstop now. You have probably noticed that each side (L/R) of most pitcher cards have two gb(SS)x results, on a 5 or 9 roll AND a 4 or 10 roll. The probability of a gb(SS)X result on a 5 or 9 roll is 11.111%, and that of a 4 or 10 roll is 8.333%.
11.111 + 8.333 = 19.444%. So, on the typical pitcher card, there is more probability of a gb(SS)X than a gb(2B)X, about 14% more. This would suggest that as important as a slick-fielding second baseman is, it is even MORE important to have an ace gloveman at SS.
But...I think that's wrong. Why?
Let's roll the dice and assume the single, red, 6-sided die has already fallen on the pitcher card. Now, take the 2 white dice and rattle them around in your fist. As they tumble from your hand, there is a much greater chance of a 7 roll than any other number. The probability of a 7 result on any single roll of 2 dice is between 1/3 to 1/2 more likely than a 4, a 5, a 9, or a 10 result. Thus each and any roll of two 6-sided dice in SOM -- a game with a finite number of rolls -- would seem always more likely to result in a gb(2b)X than a gb(SS)X on a typical pitcher card.
Only a little bit more torturous arithmetic, I promise. On some pitcher cards, the gb(2b)X result is on an 8 or 6 roll. The probability of either an 8 or 6 roll goes down to 13.89%. To compensate when that is the case, there is also a gb(2b)X result on a 2 or 12 roll. The probability of either a 2 or 12 roll is 2.78%. 13.89 + 2.78 = 16.67, same as when there is one lone gb(2b)X result on a 7 roll.
But again, the probability of a 7 on any single roll is greater than that of a 8 or a 6 or a 2 or a 12. So I can see an advantage in favoring pitcher cards with gb(2b)X on an 8 roll instead of a 7 roll, if a Jose Vidro or Matt Carpenter and not a Lajoie or Morgan is playing 2B.
Sometimes on each side of a pitcher card there is a gb(SS)X on a 7 roll, with another at a 2 or 12. To me, a pitcher card with a gb(SS)X at 7 is to be avoided, especially if I have a non-elite defender at SS. The probability of a particular roll hitting 7 and having Cecil Travis fire the ball through Al Oliver and into the stands is intolerably high. That's why I might reject a pitcher card with a 7-gb(SS)X and put up with the rock hands of a Travis or Jimmie Dykes at SS, but put up with the weak stick of a Dick Egan or Bobby Richardson on the other side of the keystone.
Some pitcher cards have a gb(2b)X AND a gb(SS)X on a 7 roll on each side. Egad, I run from those cards! Unless I have 1's at both SS and 2B, a very rare occurrence because 1's are very costly.
Otherwise, why put that much vagary in Hal's lap? 7 rolls on pitcher cards should result in strikeouts, popouts, 1 gb(2b)X, and, if you've drafted well, a golden gbA. That 7 roll must never result in a gb(SS)X (unless Ozzie's standing there), a split-chance TR or HR, or the much-overlooked nuisance of a gbC.
What does this mean? Well, for me, it means I put a greater priority on defense at 2B than at SS. Because dice roll after dice roll, your defense at 2B is likely to be put to the test more frequently.